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Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, because of rising costs for the AFDC program, increasing caseloads, and public demands for 
eliminating welfare fraud, the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now the Department 
of Health and Human Services) began scrutinizing payment procedures more closely and introduced the quality 
control program. More recent federal efforts at cost control in the AFDC program have led to an increased 
emphasis on quality control. While all states have instituted certain types of quality control programs, efforts 
have varied from state to state. 
 
During a similar time period, attitudes toward welfare and its recipients changed. For example, a poll taken in 
1961 indicated the majority of Americans felt that too little money was being spent on welfare. In contrast, 85 
percent of those polled in 1976 said that too much was being spent and, furthermore, that there were a substan-
tial number of cheaters. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare estimated in 1978 that 5.5 to 6.5 
billion dollars were lost to fraud and reports in 1980 that 376 million to 3.3 billion dollars in Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) were paid out to ineligible clients raised the ire of politicians and taxpayers 
(Joe & Rogers, 1985). 
 
Concerns over fraud and abuse are often mistakenly clouded with the issue of underpayment to needy persons. 
Many argue that we miss the boat in concentration on the elimination of isolated causes of cheating, because the 
real crime is that of neglecting worthy recipients. Fraud and abuse, like underpayment, are equally worthy areas 
of concern to the complex institution of welfare. Both must be addressed. Millions, or possibly billions, of 
dollars paid incorrectly to clients is money that could have been spent on research and policy analysis to help 
people become less dependent on a system that falls short of meeting their needs. 
 
It is necessary for social workers to address these issues in order to gain support for programs. Control of fraud 
and abuse would help quench the political fires that threaten the welfare institution. When the lid is put on abuse 
and only the truly needy receive support, the public policy makers will have fewer rationales for further 
reductions in services (Gardiner & Lyman, 1985). 
 
This article presents an assessment of states' efforts to comply with federal error tolerance levels and identifies 
seven components of strategies that have led to effective error reduction in the AFDC Program. 
 
Background Literature 
Begun in 1935 under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, AFDC is a federal grant-in-aid program to assist 
needy, dependent children. In order to receive the federal matching funds, states submit a state plan which 
adheres to federal requirements and which is approved by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS). Despite federal requirements, states are permitted a good deal of flexibility and autonomy in 
administering and designing an AFDC program. Inconsistency in the effective and efficient administration of 
public income maintenance programs has led to an increasing insistence by federal, state, and local government 
officials that states be held accountable for how public assistance dollars are spent. Recessionary economic 
conditions, increased demand for income support, and restricted government revenues to pay for such support 
place additional pressure on states' accountability. 
 
Prior to 1969, HEW federal administrators, functioning primarily as consultants rather than monitors, were able 
to deny knowledge of state noncompliance with federal regulations. Seeing their role as consultative rather than 
supervisory, the administrators believed that knowledge may imply responsibility and, therefore, ignored 
feedback regarding activities of states (Stewart, 1981). 
 
In 1969, HEW instituted a reform that re-established its role in monitoring states and enforcing grant 
requirements, thus strengthening its accountability for goal achievement (Stewart, 1981). In 1970, seven formal 
hearings against states were held on conformity of their public assistance programs with federal regulations. 
Subsequently, four of those states were faced with threats of withdrawal of funds. These threats contributed to 
the initial success of this new reform. 
 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), developed in accordance with President Reagan's 
economic plan to curb inflation and to restrict federal expenditures on public welfare, exerted further pressure 
on states for fiscal accountability in the AFDC program. Provisions of OBRA sought to improve the program's 
administrative practices, placed greater financial and administrative responsibilities on states, established more 
rigid eligibility requirements, and strengthened work requirements of recipients (Wodarski, Parham, Lindsey & 
Blackburn, 1986). 
 
Increasing pressure from the federal level caused states to pay closer attention to case error rates since high 
error levels could lead to federal fiscal sanctions. Case error rates give an indication of financial compliance 
with federal requirements and also are widely accepted as an indicator of AFDC program quality (Brodkin & 
Lipsky, 1983; Cox, 1986). While some view the increasing emphasis on error rates as a focus on accuracy and 
efficiency to the exclusion of other measures of program quality (Brodkin & Lipsky, 1983), others believe an 
emphasis on error rate is important in terms of public perceptions and economics. Brodkin and Lipsky believe 
that high error rates legitimize welfare cutbacks. By tightening administration of these programs, ineligibles 
have a harder time obtaining benefits and overpayments to eligibles are reduced, leaving more monies to be 
distributed among the eligible. Clients further benefit when administrative agencies are required to provide 
compliance information to elected officials and the public. This information can be utilized by the clients and 
their advocates to increase agency accountability, contribute to the development of coherent policy, and change 
the effectiveness in enforcement of policy requirements (Stewart, 1981). 
 
Regardless of how important one considers error rate in evaluating program quality, it is a measure of accuracy 
which has become very important to states which are attempting to comply with federal regulations. "Quality 
control" is a term which has become synonymous with "error control," and all states have developed quality 
control programs to reduce error rates. 
 
QUALITY CONTROL 
Quality control methods have been used to determine the accuracy of financial payments and eligibility criteria 
for AFDC services. This federally mandated program was fully implemented in 1974 as a corrective action 
procedure to combat rising costs in public assistance. The quality control system utilizes federal and state 
review teams and consists of three major elements audit sampling, tolerance levels, and fiscal sanctions 
(Bendick, 1980). 
 
Audit Sampling 
Every six months, state teams randomly select a significant number of AFDC cases and conduct a thorough 
audit. Trained quality control workers spend an extensive amount of time verifying case data by interviewing 
clients, checking computations, reviewing completeness of case information, and checking collateral sources 
such as banks, employers, and landlords. Payment mistakes found through this procedure fall into three 
categories: payments to ineligible recipients, overpayments to eligible recipients, or underpayments to eligible 
recipients. These mistakes are considered error payments (Bendick, 1980; Brodkin & Lipsky, 1983). Federal 
quality control reviewers reexamine a portion of the cases checked by the state teams. The proportion of 
sampled cases which contain an error are then computed and constitute the state's error rate (Ben-dick, 1980). 
 
Tolerance Levels 
Tolerance levels are established by DHHS and represent the acceptable amount of error for the states. In 1975, 
the tolerance level for AFDC payments was set at three percent for payments to ineligibles and five percent for 
overpayments and underpayments to eligible recipients (Bendick, 1980). The tolerance levels were changed in 
1979 by the Michel Amendment (Section 201 of HR 4389, PL 96-123) and later revised by the TEFRA Ac: in 
1982. Tolerance levels in 1988 are three percent for both categories. 
 
Fiscal Sanctions 
Quality control methods were initially introduced to identify factors influencing error rates so that strategies to 
streamline programs and correct flaws could be developed. However, now quality control emphasis is on fiscal 
sanctions and penalties as a motivator for state compliance (Wrafter, 1984). The federal government threatened 
to withhold funds in  
 
the amount by which a state's actual error rates exceed the [tolerance levels]. . . . In the audit period July-
December 1975, immediately following promulgation of these regulations, the AFDC jurisdiction with 
the worst error rate was the District of Columbia, with 11.1% payments to ineligibles, plus 8.6% 
overpayments (Campbell & Bendick, 1977, pp. 292, 295). The difference between 11.1% and 3%, plus 
the difference between 8.6 and 5%, which is 11.7%, would have resulted in withholding 11.7% of the 
District's federal AFDC funds. Of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, all jurisdictions except the 
state of Nevada fell outside the August 1975 tolerance level, according to the July-December audits. 
(Bendick, 1980, pp. 9-10) 
 
Much criticism and controversy have derived from the establishment of these fiscal sanctions. Many question 
how suitable this penalty is for all states when a wide range of variances of AFDC policy and procedures exist 
within and among states (Wrafter, 1984). In the state of Washington in 1976, a federal court ruled that the toler-
ance levels were "arbitrary and capricious" (Brodkin & Lipsky, 1983). In addition, with the threat of federal 
sanctions, agencies may not be meeting the needs of the clients in the most appropriate manner. Agencies may 
delay the completion of applications and may deny payments to eligible clients for fear of repercussions, 
causing needy and eligible persons to suffer. The sanctions have also, in certain cases, added tension to and 
have weakened the state and federal partnership. Finally, critics question whether quality control is even a valid 
measure of the AFDC program's effectiveness (Wrafter, 1984). 
 
Nevertheless, the quality control program has created incentives for state programs to establish corrective action 
plans. Because of the federal demand for accountability, state programs have made efforts to spend money more 
accurately. States have sought to enhance their credibility and increase the confidence of their supporters. 
"Taxpayers clearly do not get their money's worth from poorly administered programs. Similarly, clients can be 
harmed by the loss of political legitimacy that often accompanies announcements of high error rates" (Kingson 
& Levin, 1984, p. 42). 
 
ERROR FACTORS 
Quality control studies have identified factors which are associated with errors. Errors may be attributable to 
clients and to the agency. Clients are responsible for error when they misreport or fail to report case 
information, either intentionally or unintentionally. Agency errors are caused when workers fail to follow up on 
pending information, fail to verify information, fail to apply agency policies correctly, fail to solicit all the 
needed information, and/or fail to compute mathematical information correctly (Kingson & Levin, 1984). The 
possibility for error is compounded by complexity of AFDC policy and by frequent changes in policy. 
 
In one study (Bendick, Lavine & Campbell, 1978), data from quality control reports was obtained from the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia. By using multiple regression tests on error rates, five factors which greatly 
affect errors were identified. These factors include the backlogs of case redetermination; readability of public 
assistance documents; skill level of workers; the complexity of computation rules and eligibility requirements; 
and the presence of computerized equipment (Bendick, 1980). In another study by Piliavin, Masters, and 
Corbett (1979), significant factors influencing errors in AFDC payments were discovered. The researchers 
examined over five thousand "AFDC cases reviewed by Wisconsin quality-control personnel during the 
calendar years 1975 and 1976" (Piliavin, Masters & Corbett, 1979). They concluded that errors were influenced 
significantly by workers' attitudes and values; mechanisms which monitored the workers' actions; increasing 
specialization of workers' caseloads; the presence of support services for workers; the atmosphere conducive to 
job satisfaction; and "the appointment of supervisors expressly committed to controlling errors" (Piliavin, 
Masters & Corbett, 1979, p. 15). In another report, significant factors which contribute to error arc discussed 
including national and state policies and procedures, client characteristics, demographic and economic 
characteristics, and local administrative practices and procedures (Kingson & Levin, 1984). 
 
STATE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE ERRORS 
State plans for establishing more effective AFDC programs and for lowering error rates have involved many 
different strategies and approaches. AFDC corrective action is a fairly new concept and is still in an 
experimental stage for some states. However, corrective action is extremely worthwhile, since the effort, 
attention, and time spent on corrective actions are directly related to lowering error rates (DHHS, Social 
Security Administration, 1985). Certain state strategies and studies have revealed several appropriate, beneficial 
methods for reducing error rates. 
 
South Dakota 
South Dakota's State Department of Social Services was the site of a year-long training program in 1976. In 
hopes of increasing the department's effectiveness, a group of faculty from the University of Chicago School of 
Social Service Administration provided training to supervisors and line staff. The training focused on the task-
centered model for case management. The trainers used this model because of its specificity, explicitness, 
systematic quality, accountability, and short-term structure (Reid & Beard, 1980). The trainers began by 
offering a two-day workshop and giving a textbook to all workers. Next, three two-day workshops and extra 
reading materials were provided to all supervisors and line-staff who volunteered for the follow-up sessions. 
Finally, the trainers held a one-day session for all staff during which there were presentations and discussions. 
Throughout the training, some favorable and unfavorable conditions were discovered. The trainers developed a 
conducive learning environment by providing the staff with encouragement and incentives. However, much 
resistance still existed among some staff. The workers were resentful of outside "experts" developing a training 
program without their involvement in the planning process. Also, because of the geographical distance between 
the trainers and staff, frequent contact was impossible. Independent judges analyzed samples of case records 
from periods prior to and following the program. The results of the study demonstrated no evidence of a 
statistically significant training effect between pre and post comparisons. 
 
From this study, the researchers provided recommendations for developing and implementing in-service 
training programs. These include assessing the interest and commitment of the staff, determining the staff's 
level of understanding of the proposed training approach and concept, fitting the approach to the staff's needs by 
becoming informally familiar with the environment, and switching from a didactic role to a consultative role as 
soon as possible (Reid & Beard, 1980). 
 
West Virginia 
In the state program entitled, "Special Short-term Case Record Review," West Virginia sought to reduce its 
error rate and to increase worker accuracy. This program was implemented in 1984, the same year that 
California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania began similar programs. The state's administrative staff, with the 
cooperation of local AFDC coordinators, operated this one month project. First, the team developed 
computerized error prone profiles from previous quality control data. The team found three categories highly 
related to agency errors—the WIN program, vehicles, and life insurance. Next, this team explained the 
importance of this project to the local workers by stressing how the impact could affect their jobs, future 
funding of the agency, and client well-being. Each office was mandated to review all active AFDC cases for the 
three error elements (DHHS, SSA, 1985). Statewide, 28,000 cases were reviewed. Overpayment was discovered 
in 938 cases which amounted to a one month savings of $97,000. In addition to these results, the team 
discovered problem areas with agency policies and also identified a need for further worker training. In order to 
transfer this project's procedures to other states, states must have the capacity to produce error prone profiles 
and must have a strong commitment from all levels of state staff (DHHS, SSA, OFA, 1985). 
 
District of Columbia 
In 1983, the District of Columbia implemented a corrective action plan called "Project CAP" to streamline 
management procedures and to reduce the error rate. Project CAP began in April, 1983 at the request of the 
Income Maintenance Administrator. The project involved five major factors: (1) mandatory recertification of 
four error prone categories; (2) client monthly reporting using selection of error prone cases by computer; (3) a 
quality assurance program to gauge the quality of caseload management in each local center; (4) management 
information systems to monitor local office progress and to ensure implementation of corrective action plans; 
and (5) missing data project to update existing files with missing names and Social Security numbers (DHHS, 
SSA, 1985). Error prone cases that were identified for monthly reporting included wage matches of more than 
$300, two-parent households, sixteen-year-old in the household, and cases overdue for recertification (DHHS, 
SSA, 1985). All tasks associated with the project were conducted by in-house staff. Each local office began 
recertification on all error prone cases and submitted monthly reports on the status of these cases. At the end of 
six months, Project CAP was completed. A total of 10,681 cases were reviewed. From this project, the monthly 
AFDC payments decreased from $7.07 million to $6.7 million, the caseload decreased from 24,500 to 22,000, 
and the error rate dropped nearly three percent. Project CAP was considered extremely successful and many of 
its effects may be long-lasting. Four important procedures that will remain from this project include 
accountability of local centers for the implementation and development of corrective action, institution of 
central office management controls, selective case actions, and error prone profiles (DHHS, SSA, 1985). 
 
Florida 
In 1984, Florida implemented a corrective action program entitled, "Selective Case Action Review System." 
During the six months that this program was in operation, workers were to attack high error rates and to develop 
a more effective AFDC program. The team responsible for this project and for training of local staff consisted 
of a representative from the Program Planning and Development Unit, a computer programmer from the Quality 
Control unit, and an executive panel with representatives from the State Office of Administration, Program 
Planning and Development, Quality Control and from district offices. 
 
The workers sought to identify error prone cases through an AFDC quality control data processing system 
which was developed in 1980. Certain error prone cases were found to be: cases with more than four children, 
stepparent cases, cases overdue for redetermination, cases with no income present, and cases which had 
referrals to the fraud unit. Next, these error prone cases were recertified through home visits, Motor Vehicle 
Administration match, and a property match. Home visits were conducted in the five counties with the highest 
error rates. A computer match was also performed for all of these AFDC recipients with the Motor Vehicle data 
base. Finally, microfiche was obtained from the counties on real property information. Within the six months of 
this project, many cases were closed and thousands of dollars were saved. Through the home visits, 229 cases 
were closed and $44,526 was saved. The Motor Vehicle search resulted in 156 cases being closed and $32,350 
saved. No data were available on the property match. The project team also discovered that the line workers 
needed further training on corrective action procedures. Specifically, workers were not sure what data should be 
collected, how to tabulate it, and how to evaluate it. In order for other states to utilize the same procedures as 
Florida, they must be able to develop error prone files, dedicate much time, and secure complete commitment 
from all staff levels (DHHS, SSA, 1985). 
 
 
Massachusetts 
In 1979, Massachusetts paid out the largest amount of dollars in error and had the second highest quality control 
error score (24.8%) in the nation. A two-part management reform was implemented consisting of reducing up 
specific types of error and standardizing the work of assistance payment workers, making them accountable to 
management standards. 
 
Operation Perform, an enumeration campaign, was designed to ensure that a Social Security number was 
recorded for each AFDC recipient. Recipients who did not provide Social Security verification were terminated 
from assistance. Record-keeping systems were reorganized and standardized. A quality assurance system was 
developed to ensure that workers were in compliance with new procedural requirements as outlined in the new 
training program and worker handbooks. A priority redetermination system was instituted to identify error 
prone characteristics. Financial assistance workers were hired to replace social workers and performed clerical 
duties consisting of claims processing. Norms of efficiency and adherence to rules were reinforced by structural 
incentives and disincentives. "The experience . . . showed that large public agencies can be effective if given 
appropriate direction and support" (Brodkin & Lipsky, 1983, p. 16), according to Commissioner John Pratt. The 
extent to which administrative accuracy was improved and tax dollars saved was not reported. 
 
Georgia 
In an experimental design study conducted in 1981 in Chatham County, Georgia, three intervention strategies—
minimum, incidental and intensive—were defined and compared for their effectiveness in reducing payment 
error (Cox, 1986). The minimum intervention utilized the intake interview at the welfare office only, the 
incidental intervention added a home visit during the final approval phase, and the intensive strategy added a 
third variable, a second home visit in the fourth month following case approval. In 1980, the year preceding the 
study, twenty per cent of all cases had at least one payment error with a mean dollar value of $163. The subsam-
ple, drawn to explore the cause of payment error, was selected via systematic random sampling. 
 
Payment errors appear to be caused by workers' imperfect understanding and application of AFDC policy, 
clients' lack of knowledge of AFDC rules and regulations, and the willful withholding of eligibility information 
by AFDC recipients. Results of the study show that visiting AFDC applicants and recipients in their homes does 
not reliably reduce case payment errors. The study recommends supervisory checks on workers' case 
monitoring and paperwork and continued in-service training to reinforce the importance of correct income 
recording to alleviate the source of payment errors. Punishment of clients could destroy the rapport with AFDC 
workers and is unlikely to result in reduction of reporting errors. 
 
Maryland 
Data from two Maryland AFDC quality control samples are joined with data from two surveys of local 
administrative practices to examine administrative correlates of error (Kingson & Levin, 1984). Heavy 
workloads, increased workloads, a telephone system that routes reported changes directly to the caseworker, 
high worker turnover rates, and overdue redeterminations were hypothesized as correlated with increased 
AFDC error. Quality control samples were both randomly selected and representative of Maryland's AFDC 
caseload. Statistically meaningful inter-agency comparisons regarding the effect of agency practices on error 
rates were difficult to make due to the small sub-sample drawn from many local offices. However, the 
methodology does allow for the examination of whether specific practices contribute to the absence or presence 
of error on a statewide basis. 
 
The major dependent variable was the overall modified case error rate, defined as ineligible or overpaid clients 
and excluding underpaid clients. Cross tabulations and simple correlations were used to identify variables 
correlated with error. Chi-squares were used as the basis for tests of statistical significance. 
 
Major findings indicate that the use of checklists and similar resources that simplify procedures outlined in the 
comprehensive manual are associated with fifty percent less error and that certain agency procedures such as 
use of a "tickler" in conjunction with another control for follow-up and use of a message person other than the 
worker to take calls from clients are associated with lower error rates. Lower AFDC staff turnover was also 
associated with less error. Data suggest that agency procedures, while having an impact on agency error, 
actually have more of an impact on client error. The following suggestions for changes in agency practices, 
found to correlate positively with reduced error rate, were made: (1) development of a telephone system with a 
message person who records changes of status and forwards them to the worker, (2) use of follow-up controls in 
conjunction with tickler files, (3) in-house and state training focusing on reducing earned income errors, and (4) 
a personnel system that encourages staff stability. 
 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 
Review of the experiences of these seven states reveals certain strategies that are correlated with reduction in 
error rates. Following are suggested components of a model plan based on this review. 
 
1. Development of Error Prone Profiles: Four of the seven studies cited identification of elements associated 
with case or payment errors as a successful error reduction strategy. Although these elements varied from state 
to state, some of the areas cited were cases with earned income, automobiles, life insurance, and stepparents. 
 
2. Mandatory Recertification or Audit of Cases in Error Prone Categories: The states that developed error prone 
profiles implemented special projects to identify cases for special recertification or audit. Florida included 
matches with records of other institutions, such as property and motor vehicle records as part of its 
recertification process. A similar strategy is to implement a campaign to review case records for missing data, 
such as Social Security numbers or names. While these strategies would not be appropriate on an ongoing basis, 
they would be a good beginning to clear up errors in current caseloads, perhaps as a prelude to institution of 
monthly reporting for error prone cases. 
 
3. Client Monthly Reporting: This strategy requires clients whose cases involve high error elements to report to 
the agency on a monthly basis any changes that might affect their case. This is usually done through use of a 
form which is mailed out to the client and must be completed and returned by a specific date to keep the case 
active. This method of tracking the error prone cases on an ongoing basis holds the client accountable for re-
porting changes. 
 
4. Local Accountability: Two of the studies suggested development of management information systems and 
quality assurance systems to monitor progress on corrective action plans at the local office level and to assure 
that workers are complying with proper procedures. Part of a quality assurance program might include 
reorganization and standardization of record-keeping systems, a strategy recommended by the Massachusetts 
study. 
 
The above strategies are derived from the experiences of several states. The following recommendations were 
made by only one state (Maryland), but seem well worth including in any error control plan. 
 
5. Worker Use of Checklists and Simplified Resources: AFDC policy manuals are exceedingly complex and 
difficult to use. Worker resources such as checklists, interview guides, and desk guides that simplify policy and 
procedures can be a valuable asset in helping workers correctly apply policy. 
 
6. Development of a Telephone System: The Maryland study recommends having a message person to take 
phone calls from clients, record reported changes, and forward these to the appropriate worker. This was found 
to have a significant impact on client error. 
 
7. Personnel System That Encourages Staff Stability: Staff turnover is a serious problem in a program as 
complex as AFDC. Uncovered caseloads and the time necessary to train new workers increase the likelihood of 
errors. Staff should be considered a valuable resource and efforts should be made to reduce turnover. 
 
This review noted two strategies that do not seem to be effective in reducing error. General casework training 
unrelated to specific policy issues by outside experts does not seem to impact on error rates. Home visits during 
the initial approval stage or at a follow-up stage do not seem to reduce case payment errors. 
 
Regardless of the type of error reduction plan to be followed, certain intraorganizational and interpersonal 
issues must be addressed if the plan is to succeed. One report (DHHS, SSA, 1985) recommends involvement 
and commitment of staff at all levels, with a special emphasis on commitment of upper level management, and 
consideration of how the changes required by the corrective action plan will effect staff, clients, other 
departments. When staff training is a component of the plan, staff should be instructed in a clear and honest 
fashion, the trainers should remain optimistic and flexible, the project should be thoroughly and meticulously 
planned, the trainers should allow adequate training time, and an evaluation should be implemented along with 
the project. Many of these recommendations were also emphasized in the South Dakota study. 
 
Reviewed here are state strategies to reduce error rate in AFDC programs. For the most part, these efforts 
equate low case error rates with high AFDC program quality. It is of interest to note that the formula for 
determining error rate does not take into account underpayments to clients, but only overpayments and 
payments to ineligibles. Thus, the quality control efforts designed to reduce error rate, as measured by the 
federal government, are, in fact, focused on cost control. While underpayments to clients may be discovered and 
remedied through quality control programs, there is no federal incentive for states to direct efforts toward 
assuring that clients receive the full benefits to which they are entitled. 
 
Brodkin and Lipsky (1983) address this issue in their evaluation of the Massachusetts quality control program. 
In Massachusetts, improvement in administrative accuracy resulted in part from the unacknowledged and often 
unrecognizable political decision to define accuracy in terms of program restrictiveness. The other vision of 
welfare—responding to need, respecting claimants and providing help in negotiating the system (all 
incorporated in state policy)—is submerged, diminished and dismissed by the administrative politics of quality 
control. (p. 30) 
 
At present, AFDC program evaluation, at least at the state level, is directed primarily at quality control efforts to 
reduce error rates. However, accuracy and efficiency are not the only standards for judging program quality and 
effectiveness. Perhaps as states discover ways to reach and maintain federally mandated error rates, attention 
can be turned to such issues as client access to resources, nonpunitive methods for assisting clients to become as 
self-supporting as possible, research on effectiveness of various means available to reduce welfare dependency, 
and other issues that truly reflect program quality as well as fiscal accountability. 
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